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“The common law like its English king never dies, it persists from age to age, and 
though the instance of its rules may be seen to change as old conditions pass away 
and new conditions arise, its fundamental principles remain.” 
               —Bruce Wyman1 
INTRODUCTION 
In May 2014, Collin Dewberry and his partner, Kelly Williams, went to 
breakfast at Big Earl’s Bait House and Country Store in Pittsburg, Texas.2 
On their way out of the restaurant, their waitress—the daughter of the 
restaurant’s owner, Earl Cheney—asked the men not to return.3 “We don’t 
serve fags here,” she allegedly told them.4 Mr. Cheney did not deny that the 
incident occurred but claimed that what his daughter actually said was “we 
just don’t like fags.”5 He explained that the men had violated the restaurant’s 
policy because their legs were touching—their sexual orientation itself was 
not an issue, he claimed.6 “She told them the rules are on the door and it 
 
1 Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HARV. L. 
REV. 156, 160 (1904). 
2 See Summer Dashe, Couple Says They Were Asked Not to Come Back to East Texas Restaurant 
Because They Are Gay, KLTV ( July 26, 2014, 8:40 PM), http://www.kltv.com/story/25624630/ 
couple-says-they-were-asked-not-to-come-back-to-east-texas-restaurant-because-they-are-gay, 
archived at http://perma.cc/NB53-HDP8; Gay Couple Told Not to Return to East Texas Restaurant, 
CBS DALLAS / FORT WORTH (May 29, 2014, 7:04 AM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2014/05/29/ 
gay-couple-told-not-to-return-to-east-texas-restaurant, archived at http://perma.cc/QKN4-U7DU. 
3 See Gay Couple Told Not to Return to East Texas Restaurant, supra note 2. 
4 Id.  
5 See Dashe, supra note 2 (emphasis added) (“She’s a young lady, didn’t know what else to say, 
and they just kept on and she finally said we just don’t like fags.” (quoting Earl Cheney)). 
6 See id. (“Big Earl said it was their behavior, touching legs, that was against policy, not their 
sexual orientation.”); Gay Couple Told Not to Return to East Texas Restaurant, supra note 2 (“What I 
saw was one of them half way under the table with his legs stretched out into the other guy’s lap. 
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says ‘Welcome to Big Earl’s where men act like men, women act like ladies, 
no saggy pants and we reserve the right to refuse service to anyone.’”7 Mr. 
Cheney claimed that “plenty of” gay people eat at Big Earl’s and that he has 
no problem serving gay customers who adhere to the establishment’s rules.8 
“You’re welcome to come and eat, but a man act [sic] like a man and a 
woman act [sic] like a woman,” he explained.9 “[A] man’s supposed to stand 
up and be a leader. He’s not supposed to be a woman. He’s not supposed to 
come in here in a dress.”10 
The experience of Messrs. Dewberry and Williams illustrates the nuanced 
way in which businesses discriminate against gay people in modern society. 
Today’s sexual orientation discrimination does not target gay people 
categorically but rather singles out “the subset of the group that fails to 
assimilate to mainstream norms.”11 Mr. Cheney claims to have no issue with 
gay people—so long as they comport themselves according to heterosexual 
norms and present themselves as straight. Of course, saying that it is okay 
to be gay—but not to behave in any manner that could be perceived as gay—
is essentially a demand that gay people remain closeted if they wish to avoid 
discrimination.12 This regime of forced compliance with heterosexual norms 
harms human dignity and autonomy because it denies “individuals the 
freedom to elaborate their authentic selves.”13 And it harms not only the 
immediate victims of discrimination—people such as Messrs. Dewberry and 
Williams—but also every person who, fearing discrimination, forces himself 
to comply with heterosexual norms and suppresses his true identity.14 One 
of the greatest evils of modern-day sexual orientation discrimination is thus 
that so much of it goes unnoticed. 
 
And he kind of looked really possum eyed at me as they say it in East Texas, he kind of looked at 
me like ‘uh-oh.’” (quoting Earl Cheney)).  
7 Gay Couple Told Not to Return to East Texas Restaurant, supra note 2. 
8 See Dashe, supra note 2 (“The owner said plenty of gay couples eat at his restaurant without 
hassle and he has no problem with that as long as they follow his policy.”); Gay Couple Told Not to 
Return to East Texas Restaurant, supra note 2 (“Homosexuality [sic], Blacks, Hispanics—they all 
come in here—everybody comes in here to eat.” (quoting Earl Cheney)).  
9 Dashe, supra note 2. 
10 Id. (quoting Earl Cheney). 
11 KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 22 (2007). 
12 See id. at 20-26 (discussing “covering demands”).  
13 Id. at 93. 
14 Like Yoshino, I am not committed to any “rigid notion of what constitutes an authentic gay 
identity” but believe that gay people should have “the freedom to elaborate their authentic selves” 
without regard to stereotypes (either gay or straight). Id. It is certainly the case that some gay 
people will form authentic identities that incidentally comply with heterosexual norms.  
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Messrs. Dewberry and Williams were apparently left without legal 
recourse. To be sure, their story got media coverage,15 and Internet users 
exacted revenge on Big Earl’s Yelp page.16 But Texas law appeared to 
provide them no remedy: Texas is one of only five states that has no statute 
prohibiting discrimination in so-called “public accommodations”17—broadly 
defined as those businesses offering “lodging, food, entertainment, or other 
services to the public.”18 Federal law was also unavailing, as the federal public 
accommodations statutes do not cover sexual orientation discrimination.19 
Although forty-five states have enacted public accommodations statutes, 
the statutes of only twenty-one states20 and the District of Columbia21 
 
15 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2. 
16 See Big Earl’s Bait House and Country Store, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/biz/big-earls-bait-
house-and-country-store-pittsburg (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9NF9-
K2BK (displaying numerous “one-star” reviews); see also Khushbu Shah, Yelpers Slam Texas 
Restaurant for Asking Gay Couple to Not Return, EATER (May 29, 2014, 12:10 PM), http:// 
www.eater.com/2014/5/29/6216059/yelpers-slam-texas-restaurant-for-asking-gay-couple-to-not-return, 
archived at http://perma.cc/37AG-WQWY (“After a gay couple alleged that they were asked not to 
return to a restaurant in Texas because they are gay, the restaurant’s Yelp page has been pummeled 
with fake negative reviews.”). 
17 See Jeremy D. Bayless & Sophie F. Wang, Racism on Aisle Two: A Survey of Federal and State 
Anti-Discrimination Public Accommodation Laws, 2 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 288, 300 (2011). The 
other four states are Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina. See id.  
18 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 19 (10th ed. 2014). Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
one of the federal public accommodations statutes, defines “places of public accommodation” as 
including hotels, restaurants, entertainment venues, and establishments located within hotels, 
restaurants, and entertainment venues. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012). State statutes vary in the 
scope of businesses that are covered, with some statutes including retail establishments. See 
Bayless & Wang, supra note 17, at 300. 
19 Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination only “on the ground of 
race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). Title III of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, the other federal public accommodations statute, prohibits discrimination 
only “on the basis of disability.” Id. § 12182(a). Interestingly, in explaining the urgency of passing 
Title II, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce noted that only thirty-two states 
had protected against racial discrimination in public accommodations—eleven more than protect 
against sexual orientation discrimination today. See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings 
on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 1 (1963) (opening statement of Sen. 
Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce) (“In the last few days, 2 
States . . . have joined 30 other States and the District of Columbia in adopting laws against 
discrimination in public accommodations. This still leaves a substantial number of States and a 
substantial number of people without this affirmative protection.”). Whether Title II should be 
amended to cover sexual orientation discrimination is a question beyond the scope of this Comment. 
20 These states are California, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2014); Colorado, see COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 24-34-601 (2013); Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81d (2013); Delaware, see DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4503 (2014); Hawaii, see HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-3 (West 2014); Illinois, see 775 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102 (2012); Iowa, see IOWA CODE § 216.7 (2014); Maine, see ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 5, § 4592 (2014); Maryland, see MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-304 (LexisNexis 2014); 
Massachusetts, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2014) (criminalizing such discrimination); 
Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. § 363A.11 (2013); Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT. § 233.010 (2014); New 
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explicitly prohibit sexual orientation discrimination; the gay populations of 
twenty-nine states thus live without any affirmative statutory protection 
from discrimination in commerce. This Comment addresses the failure of 
these states to include gay people among those classes of persons protected 
by their public accommodations statutes. The presumption today is that 
businesses in twenty-nine states can discriminate against gay people with 
impunity—“that businesses, as property owners, have the right to exclude 
non-owners unless that right is limited by statute” and “to refuse to contract 
with anyone with whom they do not wish to deal unless required to do so by 
express statutory command.”22 
Indeed, the right to exclude others has long been a fundamental notion of 
property.23 Sir William Blackstone described “the right of property” as “that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe.”24 Blackstone’s formulation has become embedded 
in our conception of “property rights in the abstract, centered around the in 
rem right to exclude,”25 and the association between property and exclusion 
has come to pervade modern legal thought.26 One scholar has gone so far as 
to argue that the exclusionary right “is the sine qua non of property.”27 
 
Hampshire, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:17 (2014); New Jersey, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 
(West 2014); New Mexico, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(F) (2013); New York, see N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§ 296 (McKinney 2014); Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.403 (2013); Rhode Island, see R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (2013) (criminalizing such discrimination); Vermont, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 
§ 4502 (2014); Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE. § 49.60.215 (2013); and Wisconsin, see WIS. 
STAT. § 106.52 (2014).  
21 See D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31 (2014).  
22 Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1290 (1996) (emphasis added); see also infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. 
23 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying The Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, 
and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 596 (2008) [hereinafter Balganesh, 
Demystifying] (“The idea of exclusion, in one form or the other, tends to inform almost any 
understanding of property, whether private, public, or community.”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1892 (2012) (“A property right 
has long been thought to center around the idea of exclusion, and is often described as entailing the 
‘right to exclude.’”); Francisco J. Morales, Comment, The Property Matrix: An Analytical Tool to Answer 
the Question, “Is This Property?,” 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (2013) (“Some property theorists equate 
property with the right to exclude others from the thing owned.”).  
24 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (emphasis added); see also Balganesh, 
Demystifying, supra note 23, at 596 (noting Blackstone’s emphasis on exclusion).  
25 Balganesh, Demystifying, supra note 23, at 596.  
26 See id. at 597; see also id. at 596 & n.3 (noting that “the Supreme Court too has 
characterized the element of exclusion as a critical component of the property ideal”).  
27 Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Property and The Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 752 
(1998); see also Morales, supra note 23, at 1130 (noting Professor Merrill’s view that exclusion “is 
both a necessary and sufficient condition of property”). 
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But the right to exclude is subject to certain limitations. For public 
accommodations, the right to exclude historically has been counterbalanced 
by a common law duty to serve.28 Over the course of the twentieth century, 
however, the common law duty to serve fell into disuse and was replaced by 
state and federal public accommodations statutes that prohibit businesses 
from denying service to statutorily defined protected classes.29 Because public 
accommodations statutes have come to supplant the common law duty in our 
modern legal consciousness, many now believe—mistakenly, I argue—that 
these statutes are the sole source of law proscribing discrimination in 
commerce, and that if these statutes do not specifically enumerate a class or 
characteristic as among those protected, then businesses may discriminate 
against that class or characteristic with impunity.30  
Recent scholarship has largely focused on proposals to expand state 
antidiscrimination statutes to encompass sexual orientation discrimination;31 
political advocacy groups’ goals are similarly defined.32 But this Comment 
rejects the notion that gay people’s only hope for legal protection lies in 
statutory law. That certain states have not yet decided to extend statutory 
protection to gay people does not mean that those individuals are 
necessarily without legal recourse if a business should deny them service, or 
that enacting statutes is the only way to provide protection. As discussed 
above, a business’s right to exclude historically has been counterbalanced by 
a common law duty to serve. Claims based upon the foundational principles 
of this common law duty may offer gay people immediate protection against 
discrimination in states whose legislatures have failed to provide such 
protection expressly. This Comment argues that even in states that have not 
proscribed sexual orientation discrimination affirmatively by statute, such 
discrimination is nonetheless illegal as a violation of businesses’ common 
law duty to serve—and to not exclude arbitrarily—all customers.  
 
28 See infra Part I. 
29 See infra Part II. 
30 See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. 
31 See generally, e.g., Kelly Catherine Chapman, Note, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public 
Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 GEO. L.J. 1783 
(2012) (arguing for a religious exemption scheme that would promote the passage of laws 
protecting gay individuals in so-called “holdout states”); Justin Muehlmeyer, Note, Toward a New 
Age of Consumer Access Rights: Creating Space in the Public Accommodation for the LGBT Community, 
19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 781 (2013) (arguing for legislation that codifies sexual orientation 
as a protected class and defines the term “public accommodation” broadly). 
32 See, e.g., A.M. GILL, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., 2014 STATE EQUALITY 
INDEX: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL 
AND TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY AND A LOOK AHEAD IN 2015, at 14 (2015), available at 
http://www.hrc.org/files/documents/HRC-SEI-2014-ReportRev4.pdf (noting that advocates’ 
“[e]fforts to pass comprehensive non-discrimination bills will move forward” in 2015). 
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Part I explores the background of the common law duty to serve, 
beginning with its roots in English common law and tracing its evolution—
or perhaps more appropriately, regression—in the American courts in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Part II offers a brief discussion of 
the rise of public accommodations statutes in the late nineteenth and mid-
twentieth centuries, which provides a likely account for the duty’s lack of 
development over the past century. Part III explains modern-day sexual 
orientation discrimination, which is often directed not at all gay people but 
rather only at those gay persons who deviate from heterosexual norms. Part 
III hypothesizes that, today, this discrimination is perhaps most likely to 
occur in the market for commitment ceremony and wedding-related 
services. Noting that twenty-nine states lack statutory protection from 
sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations (often because 
the legislature lacks the political will to extend protection to gay people), 
Part III highlights the acute need for a revived common law duty. Finally, 
Part IV discusses the role that the common law could play in such states. 
First, courts should follow the canon of statutory construction that requires 
them to read statutes in conformity with common law principles, unless and 
until the legislature has expressed an explicit intent to abrogate the common 
law. The argument for reading public accommodations statutes in light of 
the principles of the common law duty to serve is especially strong in those 
states whose statutes, in addition to enumerating protected classes in their 
text, guarantee a right of nondiscrimination that is generally applicable to 
all persons. Because such statutes essentially codify the common law duty, 
they should be construed as imposing a ban on all arbitrary discrimination 
coextensive with the duty, or at the very least should be read in light of their 
common law background to prohibit discrimination against groups similar 
in nature to those specifically enumerated as protected classes. More 
ambitiously, Part IV argues that where courts are unwilling to extend the 
protections that the legislature has granted by statute, a common law cause 
of action could be used to combat instances of sexual orientation 
discrimination and may have some advantages over statutory protections. 
Part IV concludes by addressing the challenges that politicized state 
judiciaries might pose to reviving a common law duty-to-serve claim for gay 
plaintiffs, especially in some southern states. A short conclusion follows. 
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I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
COMMON LAW DUTY TO SERVE  
The duty to serve and its correlative right of reasonable access are deeply 
embedded in the common law.33 The common law has long imposed a duty 
upon businesses engaged in so-called “public callings”34 to serve all members 
of the general public and not to refuse service to an individual unless there 
are “reasonable” grounds for doing so.35 This Part first examines the two 
major competing theories—what I term the “economic theory” and the 
“conduct theory”—for the origin of the duty to serve at English common 
law. It then explores American courts’ deviation from the traditional 
common law duty to serve in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
A. English Origins 
Two dominant historical narratives attempt to account for the duty’s 
origins at common law: one theory posits that the duty arose out of the 
virtual monopoly power that these public callings exercised in early 
England—what I refer to as “the economic theory”—while the other looks to 
whether the business represented itself as serving the public—what I refer to 
as “the conduct theory.”36 
1. The Economic Theory 
The economic theory links the imposition of the duty to serve to the 
economic circumstances in which the business operates.37 Under this view, 
the public possesses “an interest in the conduct of” those businesses that, 
 
33 Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 373 (N.J. 1982).  
34 See Note, The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1993, 
1993 (1989); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text (listing such businesses). 
35 See Note, supra note 34, at 1995-96. 
36 Id.  
37 Professor Wyman proposes this view in his treatise on public accommodations: 
Those in a public calling have always been under the extraordinary duty to serve all 
comers, while those in a private business may always refuse to sell if they please. So great 
a distinction as this constitutes a difference in kind of legal control rather than merely one 
of degree. The causes of this division are, of course, rather economic than strictly legal; 
and the relative importance of these two classes at any given time, therefore, depends 
ultimately upon the industrial conditions which prevail at that period. 
1 BRUCE WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS AND 
ALL OTHERS ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT § 1, at 2 (1911); see also Norman F. 
Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 420 (1927) (“All trades 
in time of distress or economic paralysis were affected with a very high degree of public interest.”).  
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facing effectively no competition, function as virtual monopolies.38 The law 
seems to have first imposed the duty to serve in the fourteenth century, 
after the outbreak of the Black Death.39 The disease had so decimated the 
English population that there was a shortage of tradesmen of every sort, 
with most “in a position to exact any price they pleased.”40 All businesses 
exercised effective monopoly power; in response, governments enacted 
comprehensive criminal statutes that imposed upon all laborers and 
tradesmen the duty “to practise his calling to whomever applied”41 and 
“penalize[d] a refusal to serve in all trades.”42 Although the extent of this 
criminal legislation—and perhaps the willingness of some desperate 
customers to capitulate to high prices—appears to have limited the filing of 
civil cases,43 liability at common law for violating the duty to serve seems to 
have existed contemporaneously.44 As time went on and trade increased, 
evolving economic conditions “warrant[ed] a change in those upon whom 
the duty to serve was placed,”45 with the duty’s imposition shifting from all 
trades to only those that continued to exercise monopoly power.46 
The logic underlying this theory is that when one business exercises 
virtually exclusive control over the provision of a good or service, 
consumers suffer. If such a business were to charge an excessive price, 
potential customers would be forced to either comply with its demand or 
forego access to that good or service. But where virtual monopolies refuse 
service outright, customers are completely denied access, as no alternate 
providers exist. Whereas shops that operate in close proximity must 
compete on price to attract and retain customers—and thus cannot afford to 
choose their customers selectively if they are to remain competitive—the 
“wayside inn” feels no such market pressure and has the tired traveler at its 
 
38 1 WYMAN, supra note 37, § 36, at 30; see also Wyman, supra note 1, at 161 (“[I]n the private 
calling the situation is that of virtual competition, while in the public calling the situation is that 
of virtual monopoly.”). 
39 See Arterburn, supra note 37, at 421 (discussing the economic circumstances “which, in the 
Fourteenth Century brought most, if not all, businesses” under a legal duty to serve). 
40 Id.  
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 422. 
43 See id. at 422, 424 (hypothesizing that the extent to which the duty to serve was 
criminalized may account for the dearth of early civil cases). 
44 See id. at 424 (“There seems to have been a liability at common law without a statute, for 
we have also the court saying about this time that if a smith refuses to shoe my horse or if he 
pricks him, an action on the case lies against him.” (footnote omitted)). 
45 Id. at 425. 
46 See id. at 425-28 (offering the monopoly-power and changing-economic-circumstances 
theories to explain statements by several English courts that a carpenter would not be subject to 
the duty to serve). 
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mercy.47 Proponents of the economic theory thus argue that the common 
law imposed this special duty on certain businesses because their virtual 
monopoly power prevented the forces of the competitive market from 
adequately protecting the consumers who dealt with them.48 Under this 
view of the duty’s origin, the public interest necessitates—and thus 
justifies—the common law’s regulation of such businesses; because virtual 
monopolies “hav[e] devoted their property to a use in which the public has 
an interest, they in effect have granted to the public an interest in that use, 
and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good to the 
extent of the interest they have created.” 49  Some proponents of the 
economic theory contend that this rationale justifies imposing a duty to 
serve on modern-day monopolies, with modern economic circumstances 
determining which businesses would be subject to the duty to serve.50 
2. The Conduct Theory 
The conduct theory, the other dominant view, traces the duty’s origin to 
the emergence of the common law writ of action on the case and focuses on 
the business’s conduct toward the public.51 The argument here is that since 
“a person held himself out to serve the public generally, making that his 
business, and in doing so assumed to serve all members of the public who 
 
47 Wyman, supra note 1, at 159. 
48 See id. (“The processes of competition may be trusted in the case of the shop, [but] they 
do not act with any certainty in the case of the inn.”); see also id. at 166 (“Wherever virtual 
monopoly is found the situation demands this law that all who apply shall be served . . . without 
discrimination; otherwise in crucial instances of oppression, inconvenience, extortion and injustice 
there will be no legal remedies for these industrial wrongs.”); cf. CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL 
WM. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: A REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF 
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 
209 (1986) (“In particular, competition in a free marketplace would guarantee the public 
reasonable prices and quantities . . . . [T]hrough the doctrine of the duty to serve, the common 
law imposed an equal and adequate service requirement wherever the sovereign affirmatively 
condoned, or passively tolerated, the existence of a monopolistic supplier.”). 
49 1 WYMAN, supra note 37, § 36, at 30. 
50 See, e.g., Arterburn, supra note 37, at 427-28 (“[T]he law of public callings may be invoked 
in cases of the monopolistic trust problems of modern times. Those in the class have changed and 
will continue to change with altered economic conditions, but the reason still exists for the 
class . . . .”); Wyman, supra note 1, at 160 (“Barber, surgeon, smith, and tailor are no longer in 
common calling because the situation in the modern market does not call for it; but innkeeper, 
victualler, carrier, and ferryman are still in that classification, since even in modern trade the 
conditions require it.”). 
51 See Charles K. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, 11 
COLUM. L. REV. 514, 515 (1911) (“It would seem that the origin and basis of the liability of the 
person engaged in a common calling for failure to serve . . . is to be found in this early 
developed branch of the action on the case.”).  
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should apply, . . . he was liable in an action on the case for refusal to 
serve . . . [,] a breach of his assumpsit.”52 While an action for assumpsit 
would ordinarily require one to have assumed a specific undertaking, 
Professor Charles K. Burdick, a proponent of the conduct theory, argues 
that “[t]he fact that one was a common carrier . . . was of itself a general 
assumpsit to serve carefully.”53 Under this view, a business became a public 
calling by virtue of holding itself out54 to the public as being ready and 
willing to provide service upon request.55 Professor Burdick attributes this 
rule to Chief Justice Holt’s dissenting opinion in Lane v. Cotton: 
[W]herever any Subject takes upon himself a Publick Trust for the Benefit 
of the rest of his fellow Subjects, he is eo ipso bound to serve the Subject in 
all the Things that are within the Reach and Comprehension of such an 
Office, under Pain of an Action against him . . . . If on the Road a Shoe 
fall off my Horse, and I come to a Smith to have one put on, and the Smith 
refuse to do it, an Action will lie against him, because he has made a 
Profession of a Trade which is for the Publick Good, and has thereby 
exposed and vested an interest of himself in all the King’s Subjects that will 
employ him in the Way of his Trade.56 
Professor Burdick interprets this to mean “that originally anyone who held 
himself out to serve all who might apply was conceived of as assuming a 
public or common calling, and by force of this assumpsit was held to obligate 
himself to serve all who should apply and to serve with care.”57 He elaborates 
that in early England, “the kinds of things which a person would be likely to 
 
52 Id. at 515-16. The common law writ of assumpsit grew out of action on the case. See id. at 516 
(“[T]he action of assumpsit as we understand it . . . was evolved at a later day from the earlier action 
on the case wherein the assumpsit and its breach were . . . the vital elements of the tort.”); see also 1 
WYMAN, supra note 37, § 201, at 168 (“It has been seen that in the course of the development of our 
law the obligation resting upon one who had made a general assumption of public service preceded 
the obligation of one who had made a special promise in a particular case.” (footnote omitted)). 
53 Burdick, supra note 51, at 516. 
54 A person engaged in a common calling could “hold himself out” by posting signs outside 
his place of business, advertising in public venues, or soliciting the public “in any way that will 
give the community to understand that he wishes to do business with all comers.” 1 WYMAN, supra 
note 37, §§ 203–205, at 170-72.  
55 See Burdick, supra note 51, at 518 (“[A] person, by holding himself out to serve the public 
generally, assumed two obligations—to serve all who applied; and, if he entered upon the 
performance of his service, to do it in a ‘workmanlike manner.’”). 
56 Id. at 520-21 (quoting Lane v. Cotton, (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1464; 12 Mod. 472, 484); 
see also 1 WYMAN, supra note 37, § 202, at 169-70 (treating the same passage from Lane v. Cotton as 
expressing the “original rule”). 
57 Burdick, supra note 51, at 522.  
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hold himself out to do for all applicants would be few, perhaps not much more 
numerous than those of which we have a record in the early cases.”58  
There is some disagreement among scholars, however, as to whether 
conduct that evinces a willingness to serve the public is sufficient to make a 
business a public calling subject to the duty to serve. Professor Bruce 
Wyman, perhaps the foremost proponent of the economic theory described 
in the preceding subsection, views conduct expressing a willingness to serve 
the public as necessary, but not sufficient, to trigger imposition of the 
duty.59 For Professor Wyman, a business’s status as a public calling is 
independent of any conduct manifesting its intent to serve the public: “[I]n 
any case of public employment the evidence of profession to serve the 
public and the proof that the business is public in character must both be 
sufficient to carry conviction.”60 
B. American Deviation and Development 
American legal commentators in the early nineteenth century largely 
embraced the conduct theory, “agree[ing] that the basis of the duty of 
innkeepers and common carriers to serve the public rests on the fact that 
they hold themselves out as ready to serve anyone who seeks their 
services.”61 Most courts at the time agreed with this understanding of the 
duty’s basis. 62  Professor Joseph William Singer identifies Markham v. 
Brown,63 a case decided by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, as the first 
American case to explain the duty’s rationale.64 As Professor Singer notes,65 
the court makes clear from the beginning of its opinion that it understands 
the duty to serve’s justification to lie in the conduct theory: 
 
58 Id. Professor Burdick lists as examples “the common innkeeper and victualler, the common 
carrier, the common ferryman, the common bargeman, hoyman or other common water carrier, the 
common farrier, the common tailor, and the common surgeon.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
59 See 1 WYMAN, supra note 37, § 200, at 167-68 (“Even one who has acquired a virtual 
monopoly is not forced into service against his will; it is only when he has held himself out in 
some way as ready to serve that he is bound thereafter to deal with all indiscriminately.”). 
60 Id. at 168. 
61 Singer, supra note 22, at 1312. For a survey of the American treatise writers espousing this 
view in the antebellum period, see id. at 1312-15.  
62 See id. at 1315 (“Most of the cases decided in the United States in the antebellum period 
similarly base the duty to serve on the holding out theory.”). But see id. (“A few, however, base the 
duty on the fact that the business in question has been granted a license or franchise from the 
government.”); id. at 1318-21 (surveying the antebellum franchise cases and challenging the 
rationale behind the franchise theory). 
63 8 N.H. 523 (1837).  
64 Singer, supra note 22, at 1316. 
65 See id. at 1317. 
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An innkeeper holds out his house as a public place to which travelers may 
resort, and of course surrenders some of the rights which he would other-
wise have over it. Holding it out as a place of accommodation for travelers, he 
cannot prohibit persons who come under that character, in a proper man-
ner, and at suitable times, from entering, so long as he has the means of 
accommodation for them.66 
In Markham, an innkeeper allowed certain stagecoach drivers to solicit 
business from patrons in the common areas of his inn but at the same time 
excluded a driver employed by a rival stagecoach line.67 The court held that, 
under these circumstances, the inn’s duty to serve extended beyond 
travelers; because the owner opened the inn’s premises to some stagecoach 
drivers, “[t]here seem[ed] to be no good reason why the landlord should 
have the power to discriminate . . . and to say that one shall be admitted 
and another excluded, so long as each has the same connection with his 
guests.” 68  This rule “is expressly premised on a requirement of equal 
treatment and lack of discrimination”69 and appears to protect all citizens, 
not merely those who belong to certain protected classes.70 The court held, 
however, that certain individuals could reasonably be excluded—for 
example, those who could not pay for lodging or whose conduct would 
threaten the lawful and peaceable operation of the inn.71 American courts 
have reaffirmed this principle, consistently holding that an inn or common 
carrier’s right to exclude may be used only against those whose individual 
conduct could seriously interfere with the operation of the business.72 
Although American courts followed the content of Markham’s duty to 
serve, they did not adopt the Markham court’s rationale for determining 
which businesses owed that duty. In the period before and after the Civil 
 
66 Markham, 8 N.H. at 528 (emphasis added).  
67 See id. at 524.  
68 Id. at 529-30.  
69 Singer, supra note 22, at 1332. 
70 See id. (“Before 1850, neither common law nor statutes said anything specifically about race in 
connection with public accommodations. At least formally, this would suggest all free persons had the 
same rights of access to common callings as was enjoyed by white men.”); see also Note, supra note 34, 
at 2002 (“[T]he common law should be understood to guarantee blacks the same rights as whites. 
Although early constitutional interpretation and statutory law declared that the rights of blacks were 
limited, no common law cases state or suggest a similar premise.” (footnote omitted)). 
71 See Markham, 8 N.H. at 531 (explaining that the defendant, by his misconduct, might 
forfeit his right to be served if removing him from the inn appeared to be necessary for the 
protection of the guests or the innkeeper). 
72 See, e.g., Pearson v. Duane, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 605, 615 (1866) (“Although a railroad or 
steamboat company can properly refuse to transport a drunken or insane man, or one whose 
character is bad, they cannot expel him, after having admitted him as a passenger, and received his 
fare, unless he misbehaves during the journey.”). 
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War, American courts began limiting the businesses on which the duty to 
serve would be imposed to the narrow class of innkeepers and common 
carriers.73 This formalistic inquiry severely limited the duty’s application,74 
and it led to a “majority American rule [that] for many years disregarded 
the right of reasonable access, granting to proprietors of amusement places 
an absolute right to eject or exclude arbitrarily any person consistent with 
state and federal civil rights laws.”75  
This formalistic imposition of the duty to serve upon innkeepers and 
common carriers “do[es] not reflect the common law as it has existed from 
time immemorial”76 but appears rather to be an American innovation, 
informed largely by this country’s attempt to limit the obligation of 
businesses to serve free blacks in the wake of the Civil War and 
emancipation.77 Indeed, Justice Morris Pashman, writing for the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Uston v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., noted that the 
racial circumstances surrounding the narrowing of the duty to serve 
 
73 See, e.g., McCrea v. Marsh, 78 Mass. (1 Gray) 211, 213 (1858) (adopting the rule of Wood v. 
Leadbitter, (1845) 153 Eng. Rep. (Exch.) 351; 13 M. &. W. 838, to hold that a theatre could exclude 
a black patron at will). Professor Singer argues that race relations were responsible for the 
narrowing of the American common law duty to serve: 
The formal narrowing of public accommodations law began when McCrea v. Marsh 
adopted the rule that authorized places of entertainment to choose their customers at 
will. Adoption of th[e Wood v. Leadbitter] rule in the United States, whatever its  
justification in England, had a disparate racial impact and was undoubtedly intended 
to have such an impact. Only after the Civil War did the law in the United States 
clearly authorize most businesses to choose their customers at will. This occurred only 
after African-Americans were granted civil rights. Reversing the presumption of  
access and substituting a right to exclude served to limit these newfound civil rights. 
Only after the issue of public access became thoroughly enmeshed in the issue of ra-
cial segregation did the current common-law rule obtain its present form. 
Singer, supra note 22, at 1344-45. 
74 See Note, supra note 34, at 1996 (“Historically, American courts determined whether the 
duty to serve bound an entity through a formalistic inquiry of whether a company fell within a 
category of entities traditionally viewed as ‘public.’ This class included innkeepers and common 
carriers such as railroads and public warehouses. All other entities, including restaurants, 
racetracks, and places of amusement, were deemed private.” (footnote omitted)). 
75 Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 374 (N.J. 1982) (footnote omitted).  
76 Singer, supra note 22, at 1294. Proponents of both the economic theory and the conduct 
theory argue that the scope of businesses to which the duty applies is fluid. Professors Arterburn 
and Wyman believe that the class of businesses subject to the duty fluctuated depending upon 
economic circumstances. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Singer, supra note 22, at 
1329 (discussing Professor Wyman’s belief “that the legal sources demonstrated that many actors 
other than innkeepers and common carriers were conceptualized and characterized as ‘common 
callings’ in the antebellum period”). Professor Burdick, on the other hand, believes that any 
business that held itself out to the public had assumed common carrier status. See supra notes 51, 
53, 58 and accompanying text. 
77 Singer, supra note 22, at 1294-95.  
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“suggest that the current majority rule may have had less than dignified 
origins.” 78  In Uston, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that Resorts 
International Hotel could not exclude renowned card counter Kenneth Uston 
from its casino absent a New Jersey Casino Control Commission rule against 
card counting.79 Recognizing the arbitrary nature—and the apparent sordid 
history—of the majority American rule,80 the court held that  
when property owners open their premises to the general public in the pursuit of 
their own property interests, they have no right to exclude people 
unreasonably. On the contrary, they have a duty not to act in an arbitrary 
or discriminatory manner toward persons who come on their premises. 
That duty applies not only to common carriers, innkeepers, owners of 
gasoline stations, or to private hospitals, but to all property owners who open 
their premises to the public. Property owners have no legitimate interest in 
unreasonably excluding particular members of the public when they open 
their premises for public use. 81 
The New Jersey rule appears to radically expand the scope of the duty to 
serve but in reality marks a return to the duty’s common law foundations. 
The court’s view of the duty to serve embraces the conduct theory, just as 
the Markham court did before the Civil War. Justice Pashman rejected “the 
current majority American rule [that] has for many years disregarded the 
right of reasonable access,” 82  noting that at the time the Fourteenth 
Amendment was passed the common law was thought to guarantee access to 
places of public accommodation,83 and that the majority rule favoring strong 
owner exclusionary rights appears to have come into being only after the 
passage of the Reconstruction Era Amendments and Civil Rights Act of 
1866.84 New Jersey is the only state to have returned to the traditional duty 
 
78 Uston, 445 A.2d at 374 n.4; see also Singer, supra note 22, at 1294 (discussing Justice 
Pashman’s observation in Uston). 
79 See Uston, 445 A.2d at 375. The court held that because the New Jersey Casino Control 
Commission had been granted exclusive authority by statute to set the rules of casino games, Resorts 
International Hotel could not reasonably exclude Uston for card counting, which the Commission 
had not proscribed. See id. at 371. 
80 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
81 Uston, 445 A.2d at 375 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
82 Id. at 374. 
83 See id. at 373-74 (“Underlying the congressional discussions and at the heart of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection, was the assumption that the State . . . by 
‘the good old common law’ was obligated to guarantee all citizens access to places of public 
accommodation.” (quoting Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 296 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).  
84 See id. at 373; see also id. at 374 n.4 (“The denial of freedom of reasonable access in some 
States following passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the creation of a common law 
 
  
1512 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1497 
 
to serve.85 The states’ vast expansion of the duty to serve by statute, 
discussed in the next Part, may explain why the American common law rule 
has seen such little development,86 given that “the presumption . . . that 
businesses, as property owners, have the right to exclude non-owners unless 
that right is limited by statute” is apparently still “the law in every 
jurisdiction in the United States except the State of New Jersey.”87 
II. THE RISE OF STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS STATUTES 
In the mid-nineteenth century, states began codifying the duty to serve 
through public accommodations statutes.88 As Justice Kennedy explained in 
Romer v. Evans, these statutes were a direct response to the common law’s 
failure to address racial discrimination adequately.89 With the Supreme 
Court having held that Congress’s first attempt at a federal public 
accommodations statute exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment power, 90 the 
states were forced to act. 91 While the common law duty “was a general one 
and did not specify protection for particular groups,”92 these state statutes 
expressly included race as a protected class against which discrimination was 
prohibited and, in what marked a slight step back from the then-emerging 
majority American common law rule, usually covered some places of 
amusement in addition to inns and common carriers.93 Progress in this 
endeavor, however, was very slow; a 1949 study found that only eighteen 
 
freedom to arbitrarily exclude following invalidation of segregation statutes, suggest that the 
current majority rule may have less than dignified origins.”). 
85 See Singer, supra note 22, at 1290. 
86 See Note, supra note 34, at 1996 (“In many jurisdictions, the duty to serve doctrine has lain 
dormant . . . , at least with respect to inns and common carriers. The absence of recent cases 
largely results from the existence of regulatory statutes that responded to specific types of refusals 
to serve.”). 
87 Singer, supra note 22, at 1290. 
88 See Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public 
Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 215, 238 (1978) (discussing an 1865 Massachusetts statute that prohibited discrimination 
on the basis of race in places providing essential goods and services, and similar statutes enacted 
by other states in the ensuing decades). 
89 See 517 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1996) (“The common-law rules, however, proved insufficient in 
many instances . . . . In consequence, most States have chosen to counter discrimination by 
enacting detailed statutory schemes.”). 
90 See id. at 628 (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)).  
91 See id.  
92 Id. at 627; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
93 See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 88, at 240 (“These laws generally prohibited a short 
list of places from excluding blacks because of their race. The places most commonly covered were 
inns, taverns, hotels, public conveyances, restaurants, theaters, and barber shops.”).  
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states had enacted public accommodations statutes as of that time.94 The 
emergence of the African-American Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s 
and 1960s brought considerable change.95 By the time that Congress finally 
prohibited public accommodations discrimination on the federal level through 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,96 only thirty-two states had enacted 
similar public accommodations laws prohibiting racial discrimination.97 Title 
II prohibits discrimination only “on the ground of race, color, religion, or 
national origin,”98 and the establishments covered are essentially limited to 
those businesses that state statutes covered at the time of its enactment—
namely, those related to travel and amusement.99  
Professors Thomas E. Merrill and Henry E. Smith argue that Title II’s 
“provision regarding entertainment venues in particular goes beyond the 
common-law definition” and that “[i]t appears that the expansive definition 
of public accommodation in the 1964 Act has had some gravitational effect 
on the common-law definition,” citing Uston as an example.100 But history 
suggests that Title II’s definition was influenced by state statutes,101 which 
themselves had sought, at least in part, to restore the antebellum common 
law rule’s scope of coverage.102 And as Justice Pashman made clear in his 
opinion, Uston’s extension of the duty to serve to a casino was not influenced 
by Title II but rather, like Title II, was a rejection of the narrower American 
 
94 Id. at 239-40 (citing THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE 
LAW, 1849–1970, at 251 (Richard Bardolph ed., 1970)).  
95 See id. at 240 (discussing the impact of demonstrations and sit-ins on the passage of state 
public accommodation statutes); see also Muehlmeyer, supra note 31, at 788 (“It was not until the 
peak of the civil rights struggle of the 1960s that legislation prohibiting race discrimination began 
to accelerate.”). 
96 Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. II, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000a–2000a-6 (2012)).  
97 See supra note 19. 
98 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012). 
99 Title II covers lodging (“any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging 
to transient guests”); dining establishments (“any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, 
soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises”); 
“gasoline station[s],” places of amusement and entertainment (“any motion picture house, theater, 
concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment”); and any 
establishment that is either “physically located within the premises of any . . . covered” 
establishment or “within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment” 
and “which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.” Id. § 2000a(b)(1)-(4). 
While Title II has been effective in prohibiting discrimination in these categories, it does not apply to 
many other businesses. See Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 88, at 222. 
100 See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS 
TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 80 (2010). 
101 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text. 
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duty that emerged in the aftermath of the Civil War and was an embrace of 
the duty’s broader foundational principles.103 
State statutes have rapidly expanded in the years following Title II, both 
in the number of classifications protected and the scope of establishments 
covered.104 At present, all but five states—Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, and Texas—have enacted public accommodations 
statutes.105 The states’ vast expansion by statute of the duty to serve likely 
explains why the American common law rule has seen such little 
development,106 with only New Jersey having revisited and revived the duty 
to serve.107 
III. THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 
“This is the essence of discrimination: formulating opinions about others not based 
on their individual merits but rather on their membership in a group with assumed 
characteristics.” 
  —Joe Miller, Andrew Beckett’s attorney in the film Philadelphia, 
reading aloud in the University of Pennsylvania’s law library108 
A. The Contours of Modern Sexual Orientation Discrimination  
Sexual orientation, as a classification, is somewhat amorphous. As one 
court has observed, gay people often lack “obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group,” because 
gay “identity is defined by subjective and unapparent characteristics such as 
innate desires, drives, and thoughts.” 109  Modern-day sexual orientation 
discrimination in public accommodations is thus more nuanced. It is not 
likely to be targeted at all gay people categorically but rather only toward 
those individuals whose behavior deviates from heterosexual stereotypes. 
Indeed, those individuals may very well be the only people who are 
identifiable as gay. Discrimination against gay people thus targets not status 
 
103 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
104 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2014) (listing the set of classifications that the 
statute covers, including sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical 
condition, genetic information, marital status, and sexual orientation). 
105 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
106 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
107 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
108 PHILADELPHIA (TriStar Pictures 1993). 
109 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 
1995) (citations omitted), vacated on other grounds, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996). 
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(i.e., being gay) but rather behavior (i.e., acting gay). As Kenji Yoshino has 
described: 
We are at a transitional moment in how Americans discriminate. In the old 
generation, discrimination targeted entire groups—no racial minorities, no 
women, no gays, no religious minorities, no people with disabilities allowed. 
In the new generation, discrimination directs itself not against the entire 
group, but against the subset of the group that fails to assimilate to 
mainstream norms. This new form of discrimination targets minority 
cultures rather than minority persons. Outsiders are included, but only if 
we behave like insiders—that is, only if we cover.110  
By “covering,” Yoshino means “ton[ing] down a disfavored identity to fit 
into the mainstream.” 111  Gay individuals cover by acting “straight.” 
Businesses that discriminate against those gay customers who deviate from 
the “mainstream” (i.e., heteronormativity) force gay people to cover if they 
wish to avoid discrimination. This harms gay individuals’ dignity and 
autonomy by threatening their “desire for authenticity, our common human 
wish to express ourselves without being impeded by unreasoning demands 
for conformity.”112 Indeed, as the Supreme Court recognized in Lawrence v. 
Texas, sexual orientation “involv[es] the most intimate and personal choices 
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy.”113 Because businesses that impose covering demands seek to 
regulate the ways in which people express their identities, modern 
antidiscrimination law must go beyond immutable statuses such as “skin 
color, chromosomes, or innate sexual orientation” and protect “the 
behavioral aspects of our personhood.”114 
B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Practice 
The discrimination faced by Messrs. Dewberry and Williams, discussed in 
the Introduction, was exactly of the modern sort Yoshino describes. The 
owner of Big Earl’s claimed that the men were not welcome back at his 
restaurant not because of their sexual orientation but rather on account of 
conduct—intimate touching—that made their sexual orientation manifest.115 
 
110 YOSHINO, supra note 11, 21-22. 
111 Id. at ix. 
112 Id. at xii. 
113 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851 (1992)). 
114 YOSHINO, supra note 11, at xi-xii. 
115 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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The problem with this distinction is that the only people who are likely to be 
identifiable as gay in the first instance are those whose appearance116 or 
behavior 117  deviates from heterosexual norms; discrimination directed at 
conduct associated with a gay identity thus increases pressure on those who 
are capable of passing as straight to do so. It is perverse to claim that one does 
not discriminate against gay customers when one discriminates against any 
behavior that one associates with being gay. And even assuming that 
businesses could learn the sexual orientation of some straight-appearing gay 
customers and would not discriminate against those individuals, the harm to 
the dignity and autonomy of non-conforming and forced-to-cover gay 
customers would be no less severe. A business’s decision to exempt from 
discrimination those customers who, for all intents and purposes, appear to be 
straight only reinforces heterosexual privilege and should not excuse sexual 
orientation discrimination against others. And to the extent that those 
straight-appearing gay customers are themselves being coerced to comply 
with a business’s covering demands, they too are victims of discrimination. 
This conduct-focused discrimination occurs frequently in the market for 
wedding services. Indeed, with the rapid expansion of same-sex marriage 
across the states118 and the Supreme Court poised to rule in favor of 
marriage equality this Term,119 this market will arguably be one of the most 
 
116 Muehlmeyer, supra note 31, at 800 (noting that some LGBT individuals experience 
discrimination “based on their appearance”). 
117 See id. (noting that “some LGBT individuals are extremely expressive of their orientations”). 
One Oklahoma restaurant owner, who refuses to serve gays, believes he “can spot a freak or a f****t” 
and “do[es]n’t like girlie men.” Owner of Oklahoma Restaurant Gary’s Chicaros Club Says He Refuses to 
Serve Gay People, HUFFPOST GAY VOICES (Feb. 8, 2014, 8:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/02/07/garys-chicaros-oklahoma-restaurant-serve-gays_n_4746095.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
89MG-EBUH. For a discussion of “the broader cultural privileging of masculinity in men—and in 
many contexts, though not all, femininity in women—in the intimate domain,” see Elizabeth F. 
Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1307, 1344 & n.161 (2009). 
118 As of this writing, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia allow persons of the 
same sex to marry. See States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/X7LS-SX7S (displaying a map of the jurisdictions 
that allow same-sex couples to marry).  
119 The Supreme Court appears prepared to rule this Term that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires the states to license marriages between persons of the same sex. See Adam Liptak, Justices 
to Decide Marriage Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2015, at A1 (“The Supreme 
Court’s . . . last three major gay rights rulings suggest that the court will rule in favor of same-
sex marriage.”); Ben Smith & Chris Geidner, Obama Welcomes Supreme Court Move to End 
“Patchwork” Marriage Laws, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 10, 2015, 6:24 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
bensmith/obama-welcomes-supreme-court-move-to-end-patchwork-marriage, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/B5L8-NLK6 (“My sense is that the Supreme Court is about to make a shift, one that I 
welcome, which is to recognize that—having hit a critical mass of states that have recognized 
same-sex marriage—it doesn’t make sense for us to now have this patchwork system.” (quoting 
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likely commercial contexts in which sexual orientation discrimination 
occurs. Indeed, in those states where public accommodations statutes do 
include sexual orientation as a protected class, claims of discrimination 
commonly implicate wedding services.120 The certainty of the parties’ sexual 
orientation when procuring services for a same-sex commitment ceremony 
or wedding (as opposed to fleeting and impersonal commercial exchanges 
where one’s sexual orientation might escape notice) provides one account 
for why wedding services are a frequent site of sexual orientation 
discrimination.121  
Modern attitudes toward homosexuality offer a more illuminating (and 
complete) explanation. The American public’s support for legalizing same-
sex marriage has consistently lagged behind its support for granting other 
rights and benefits to gay people.122 This is because marriage touches on 
 
President Barack Obama)); see also Lucy McCalmont, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: America More Accepting 
of Gay Marriage, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2015, 8:49 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/ruth-
bader-ginsburg-gay-marriage-115142.html, archived at http://perma.cc/237Q-C567 (reporting Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s recent comments that it “‘would not take a large adjustment’ for Americans 
to support same-sex marriage if the [C]ourt were to rule in favor of it”). Accordingly, we may soon 
be confronted with a landscape in which all twenty-nine states that do not prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination in public accommodations must license same-sex marriages.  
120  See Chapman, supra note 31, at 1790 (“As gay-marriage laws gain traction, public 
accommodations statutes are uniquely positioned as a point of contention because marriage-related 
public accommodations contexts are those in which the conflict appears so commonly.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
121 See Muehlmeyer, supra note 31, at 809 (noting that “the typical LGBT experience with 
discrimination does not generally occur in simple consumer transactions like buying milk at the 
grocery store, but rather in transactions that involve cultural values and close personal interaction 
like wedding services, education, and housing”). I by no means intend to suggest that gay 
individuals do not experience discrimination in exchanges unrelated to marriage or that such 
discrimination is less serious of a problem. 
122 Although many Americans appear to disapprove of both homosexuality and gay sex, they 
seem to oppose discrimination against gays in almost every legal context other than marriage. In 
2013, 64% of Americans surveyed by Gallup thought that gay sex between consenting adults should 
be legal, whereas only 54% supported same-sex marriage. See Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2VBW-B533. In a 2012 poll, support for other rights was higher, such as health 
insurance and other employee benefits for gay domestic partners and spouses (77%) and 
inheritance rights for gay domestic partners or spouses (78%). Id. Going back to 2008, although 
only 57% of Americans surveyed felt that “homosexuality should be considered an acceptable 
alternative lifestyle,” 89% felt that “homosexuals should . . . have equal rights in terms of job 
opportunities.” Id. Governor Mitt Romney, the Republican Party’s eventual presidential nominee, 
demonstrated this dichotomous view of gay rights during a debate before the 2012 New 
Hampshire Republican primary:  
I don’t discriminate. And in the appointments that I made when I was governor of 
Massachusetts, a member of my Cabinet was gay. I appointed people to the bench, 
regardless of their sexual orientation, made it very clear that, in my view, we should 
not discriminate in hiring policies, in legal policies. At the same time, from the very 
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cultural and religious values123 in a way that homosexuality, broadly defined, 
does not. Many Americans do not want to see gay people suffer harm and 
discrimination but view same-sex marriage as impinging upon their deeply 
held moral and religious beliefs. This dichotomous stance on gay rights is 
seen in those businesses that express a willingness to serve gay people but 
refuse to provide services for same-sex weddings.124  
Although marriage is a traditionally heteronormative institution, 125 
seeking to marry a person of the same sex may be viewed as “an act of 
flaunting”126 one’s sexual orientation, and “[t]he contemporary resistance to 
gay marriage can be understood as a covering demand: Fine, be gay, but don’t 
shove it in our faces.”127 The wedding-services market is one in which covering 
one’s gay identity is practically impossible, regardless of one’s appearance or 
behavior. A customer who might appear straight while dining in a 
restaurant, for example, will necessarily “out” herself as gay in seeking 
services for her wedding.128 Businesses that have refused to provide services 
for same-sex weddings have advanced the same argument as Big Earl’s, 
claiming that they do not discriminate against gay individuals, just gay 
conduct: they claim to be perfectly willing to serve gay customers, just not 
gay customers who are getting married.129 
 
beginning in 1994, I said to the gay community, “I do not favor same-sex marriage.” I 
oppose same-sex marriage, and that has been my view. But if people are looking for 
someone who will discriminate against gays, or will in any way try and suggest that 
people that have different sexual orientation don’t have full rights in this country, 
they won’t find that in me.  
CBS News, Santorum, Romney Questioned over Gay Rights, YOUTUBE ( Jan. 8, 2012), http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=U9pjtfvecLg, archived at http://perma.cc/9L6C-4PR8. 
123 See Muehlmeyer, supra note 31, at 794-95, 809-10 (discussing the prevalence of conflict in 
exchanges touching on cultural values, such as marriage-related services). 
124 See infra note 129 and accompanying text.  
125 YOSHINO, supra note 11, at 91. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 19. 
128 This would be especially unavoidable in the case of more personalized wedding services 
that require specific details about, or even physical presence at, the wedding, such as invitation 
printing or photography. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 61 (N.M. 2013) 
(“It was apparently Willock’s e-mail request to have Elane Photography photograph Willock’s 
commitment ceremony to another woman that signaled Willock’s sexual orientation to Elane 
Photography, regardless of whether that assessment was real or merely perceived.”). 
129 See, e.g., Reply Brief of Petitioner at 1-2, Elane Photography, 309 P.3d 53 (No. 33,687) 
(arguing that a photography studio that “would have provided other services” to a lesbian woman 
“did not decline [to photograph her commitment ceremony] because she is homosexual” and that 
the studio “serves homosexuals” in other contexts); cf. Conor Friedersdorf, Should Christian Bakers 
Be Allowed to Refuse Wedding Cakes to Gays?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2014, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/should-christian-bakers-be-allowed-to-refuse-
wedding-cakes-to-gays/284061, archived at http://perma.cc/N9JU-94K5 (quoting conservative 
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In Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, petitioner Elane Photography, 
LLC, invoked this status–conduct distinction.130 When Vanessa Willock 
contacted Elane Photography about her upcoming commitment ceremony 
to another woman,131 the company’s co-owner, Elaine Huguenin, responded 
that she served only “traditional weddings” and “d[id] not photograph same-
sex weddings.”132 Willock brought a complaint against Elane Photography 
before the New Mexico Human Rights Commission (NMHRC), pursuant 
to the New Mexico Human Rights Act,133 a statute that prohibits sexual 
orientation discrimination in public accommodations. 134  The NMHRC 
found that Elane Photography had discriminated on the basis of sexual 
orientation in refusing to photograph Willock’s commitment ceremony.135 
Elane Photography appealed the administrative decision to the New Mexico 
state district court, which granted summary judgment for Willock;136 the 
New Mexico Court of Appeals later affirmed.137 Taking the case to the New 
Mexico Supreme Court, Elane Photography argued that it refused to serve 
 
pundit Erick Erickson, who argued that a Christian business owner “should no more be allowed to 
deny service to a gay person than to a black person” when “serving a meal at a restaurant” or 
“baking a cake for a birthday party” but could reasonably refuse to serve a gay person’s “wedding, 
which millions of Christians view as a sacrament of the faith . . . ordained by God to reflect a 
holy relationship”). 
130 309 P.3d at 61; see also infra note 138 and accompanying text.  
131  The court noted “the parties[’] agree[ment] that the [commitment] ceremony was 
essentially a wedding.” 309 P.3d at 59 n.1. New Mexico prohibits sexual orientation discrimination 
through its public accommodations statute, the New Mexico Human Rights Act. See N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 28-1-7(F) (2013) (declaring that “[i]t is an unlawful discriminatory practice” for “any 
person in any public accommodation to make a distinction, directly or indirectly, in offering or 
refusing to offer its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to any person because 
of . . . sexual orientation”). New Mexico defines the term “public accommodation” broadly, as 
“any establishment that provides or offers its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to the 
public, but does not include a bona fide private club or other place or establishment that is by its 
nature and use distinctly private.” Id. § 28-1-2(H). The commitment ceremony at issue in Elane 
Photography took place prior to New Mexico’s 2013 legalization of same-sex marriage. See Griego v. 
Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 872 (N.M. 2013) (“[B]arring individuals from marrying and depriving them 
of the rights, protections, and responsibilities of civil marriage solely because of their sexual 
orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause under Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico 
Constitution.”). Now that same-sex marriage is legal in New Mexico, the number of same-sex 
wedding ceremonies—and thus occasions for discrimination prohibited by the state’s statute—will 
almost surely increase. 
132 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 60. 
133  See id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-10 (2013) (outlining New Mexico’s 
administrative grievance procedure, including the requirement of identifying either the secretary’s 
regulation or the section of the Human Rights Act alleged to have been violated). 
134 See supra note 131. 
135 See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 60 (describing the procedural history of the case). 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
  
1520 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1497 
 
only gay commitment ceremonies, not gay people, which meant that it did not 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.138 The court flatly rejected 
any distinction between discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
and discrimination on the basis of conduct “closely correlated with sexual 
orientation,”139 finding that both constitute sexual orientation discrimination: 
“We agree [with the United States Supreme Court] that when a law 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, that law similarly 
protects conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual orientation.”140 The court 
found that Elane Photography’s willingness to serve gay people in contexts 
that “do not reflect the client’s sexual preferences . . . does not cure its 
refusal to provide other services that it offered to the general public.”141  
As both the United States Supreme Court and the New Mexico 
Supreme Court have held, there is no legitimate distinction to be drawn 
between discrimination on the basis of a status and discrimination on the 
basis of conduct “inextricably tied” to that status.142 The Elane Photography 
court thus demonstrated that states with public accommodations statutes 
that protect “sexual orientation” are analytically equipped to deal with the 
realities of modern-day sexual orientation discrimination. But there remain 
twenty-nine states whose laws ostensibly do not protect gay people from 
discrimination in public accommodations. 
Many believe that because the statutes of only twenty-one states 
enumerate sexual orientation as a protected class, discrimination against gay 
people is thus legal in the remaining twenty-nine.143 This view was widely 
espoused in news coverage and commentary surrounding Indiana’s recently 
enacted Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which in its initial form 
extended a judicial defense against discrimination claims not only to 
individuals and religious organizations but also to 
 
138 See id. at 61; see also Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 129, at 1-2.  
139 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 61 (emphasis added). 
140 Id. at 62. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Christian Legal Society 
Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010), 
in which the Supreme Court (in turn quoting its own decisions in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), and Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993)) noted its refusal to 
distinguish between status and conduct. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 61-62. 
141 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 62. 
142 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
143 See, e.g., David S. Cohen & Leonore Carpenter, Anti-Gay Bias Legal in Indiana Before New 
Law: Column, USA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2015, 5:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/ 
2015/03/31/indiana-religious-freedom-restoration-act-discrimination-anti-gay-column/70723684, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AHF5-RB9D (“The much-discussed case of the baker who doesn’t 
want to bake a cake for a gay couple’s wedding? In 29 states, . . . the baker is allowed to refuse 
service because the couple is gay . . . .”).  
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[a] partnership, a limited liability company, a corporation, a company, a 
firm, a society, a joint-stock company, an unincorporated association, or 
another entity that . . . exercises practices that are compelled or limited 
by a system of religious belief held by . . . the individuals . . . who have 
control and substantial ownership of the entity, regardless of whether the 
entity is organized and operated for profit or nonprofit purposes.144  
The list of entities entitled to the defense encompasses nearly all private 
businesses.145 Members of the media widely characterized the bill as giving 
businesses license to discriminate against gay people.146 Indeed, immunizing 
businesses’ discrimination against gay people appears to have been the 
motivating purpose of the law.147 Opposition from political and business 
leaders was intense,148 with Indianapolis-based Angie’s List canceling a 
 
144  S. Enrolled Act 101, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015), available at 
http://iga.in.gov/static-documents/9/2/b/a/92bab197/SB0101.05.ENRS.pdf.  
145 See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Mike Pence Is Either Lying or Deluded About Indiana’s “Religious 
Freedom” Law, SLATE (Mar. 31, 2015, 1:26 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/31/ 
mike_pence_is_either_lying_or_deluded_about_indiana_s_religious_freedom.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/H2XP-CK3H (observing that “the bill explicitly permits for-profit businesses to 
exercise their religious beliefs, rather than limiting its effects to regular human beings”).  
146 See, e.g., id. (noting that the Indiana law “has come under severe criticism for potentially 
granting businesses a license to discriminate against gays and lesbians based on their owner’s 
religious prejudices”).  
147 See Zack Ford, The True Intent of Indiana’s ‘Religious Freedom’ Bill, According to the People 
Who Helped Write It, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 31, 2015, 9:43 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
lgbt/2015/03/31/3640801/conservatives-indiana-discrimination, archived at http://perma.cc/3KBK-
BTUG (highlighting public statements of proponents of the law that evinced an intent to protect 
businesses that discriminate against gay customers); see also Indiana Governor Insists New Law Has 
Nothing to Do with Thing It Explicitly Intended to Do, ONION (Mar. 30, 2015), http:// 
www.theonion.com/articles/indiana-governor-insists-new-law-has-nothing-to-do,38330, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5ZH5-4CMP (mocking the notion that the Indiana law had any purpose other 
than protecting businesses that refused to serve gay customers).  
148 See Michael Babario & Erik Eckholm, Indiana Law Denounced as Invitation to Discriminate 
Against Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/us/politics/indiana-
law-denounced-as-invitation-to-discriminate-against-gays.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PE69-
YQ4V (noting that “influential national leaders, including Hillary Rodham Clinton and Tim 
Cook, the chief executive of Apple, had weighed in against the law, calling it a disappointing 
invitation to discriminate,” and detailing outrage among other business leaders, actors, and 
athletes); see also Tim Cook, Dangerous Laws, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2015, at A1 (“Regardless of 
what the law might allow in Indiana or Arkansas, [Apple] will never tolerate discrimination.”); 
Hillary Clinton, TWITTER (Mar. 26, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://twitter.com/HillaryClinton/status/ 
581267449523343360, archived at http://perma.cc/3E97-2B2V (“Sad this new Indiana law can 
happen in America today. We shouldn’t discriminate against p[eo]pl[e] b[e]c[ause] of who they 
love . . . .”). 
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planned $40 million expansion of its headquarters 149  and Apple chief 
executive Tim Cook going so far as to call the law “dangerous.”150 Because 
Indiana’s public accommodations statute does not explicitly include sexual 
orientation as a protected class,151 however, some commentators—including 
gay rights advocates—argued that the law did not have the effect of 
legalizing discrimination because, in their view, it was already legal to 
discriminate against gay people in Indiana.152  
 These allegations echo arguments made last year in response to 
Arizona’s controversial SB 1062,153 a 2014 bill that, had it been signed into 
law, 154  would have amended Arizona’s existing Religious Freedom 
 
149 See Tim Evans, Angie’s List Canceling Eastside Expansion over RFRA, INDIANAPOLIS STAR 
(Apr. 2, 2015, 11:38 AM), http://www.indystar.com/story/money/2015/03/28/angies-list-canceling-
eastside-expansion-rfra/70590738, archived at http://perma.cc/F7GE-NJEW. 
150 See Cook, supra note 148 (“There’s something very dangerous happening in states across 
the country. A wave of legislation, introduced in more than two dozen states, would allow people 
to discriminate against their neighbors. Some, such as the bill enacted in Indiana last week that 
drew a national outcry and one passed in Arkansas, say individuals can cite their personal religious 
beliefs to refuse service to a customer or resist a state nondiscrimination law.”).  
151 See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (2014) (prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations 
on the basis of “race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry”).  
152 See, e.g., Cohen & Carpenter, supra note 143 (“[T]he reality of the situation is that even 
before this law was passed, most gay and lesbian Hoosiers had almost no protection  
anyway . . . . The bottom line is that the businesses that are pulling their money out of Indiana 
were already doing business in a state that allowed anti-gay discrimination.”). Professors Cohen 
and Carpenter allege that the controversy over the Indiana act “has fed a basic misunderstanding 
about the underlying state of the law.” Id. The professors’ claim, however, depends upon the 
erroneous view that only statutes protect individuals from discrimination. For another example of 
the view that “[a]ny type of private discrimination is legal unless a state or federal law specifically 
forbids it,” see Garrett Epps, Public Accommodations and Private Discrimination, ATLANTIC (Apr. 
14, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/public-accommodations-
and-private-discrimination/390435, archived at http://perma.cc/K7LM-EL3M.  
153 See, e.g., Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., The Terms of Our Surrender, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2014, at 
SR12 (“Never mind that in Arizona it’s currently legal to discriminate based on sexual 
orientation . . . .”); Magnus Samuelsson, Comment to Arizona and the Right to Discriminate, 
HARV. POL. REV. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/arizona-right-
discriminate, archived at http://perma.cc/KA9B-X4NY (“It is already legal to discriminate against 
members of the LGBT community in Arizona. And you don’t even need to have a ‘religious 
reason’ to do it. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not extend protections to LGBT persons, and 
Arizona does not have any state laws which explicitly offer protections against LGBT 
discrimination.”); Scott Shackford, News Flash: It’s Already Legal to Deny Service to Gays in Arizona, 
REASON.COM HIT & RUN BLOG (Feb. 21, 2014, 11:05 AM), http://reason.com/blog/ 
2014/02/21/news-flash-its-already-legal-to-deny-ser, archived at http://perma.cc/L35A-KCWX 
(“Actually, Arizona’s laws already give businesses the right to discriminate against gays. 
Sexual orientation is not included in Arizona’s public accommodation laws. Discrimination 
against gays is actually legal in a lot of places in America still.”).  
154 Arizona Governor Jan Brewer vetoed the bill under pressure from gay rights groups, 
political leaders, and the business community. See Cindy Carmaco, Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer Vetoes 
So-Called Anti-Gay Bill, L.A. TIMES NATION NOW BLOG (Feb. 26, 2014, 5:04 PM), 
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Restoration Act155 to cover a list of entities similar in scope to that covered 
by the Indiana law.156 The public outcry over the Indiana bill became so 
intense, however, that the state amended the law to state explicitly that it 
neither “authorize[s] a provider to refuse to offer or provide services, 
facilities, use of public accommodations, goods, employment, or housing” 
on the basis of classes including “sexual orientation” nor “establish[es] a 
defense to a civil action or criminal prosecution for refusal” to serve gay 
people. 157  This amendment only limited the application of Indiana’s 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act; it did not provide any affirmative 
statutory protection for gay people, who appear to remain unprotected by 
Indiana’s public accommodations statute. 158  But does a state public 
accommodations statute’s failure to explicitly identify sexual orientation as a 
protected class mean that there is consequently a legal right to discriminate 
on the basis of sexual orientation in that state? Might courts, reading these 
public accommodations laws broadly, find sexual orientation discrimination 
illegal, despite the lack of an explicit statutory statement to that effect? As 
the next Part argues, courts can—and should—prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination in public accommodations through a revival of the common 
law duty to serve. 
 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-arizona-gay-brewer-20140226-story.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/PYV9-HNYY; see also Mitt Romney, TWITTER (Feb. 24, 2014, 1:41 
PM), http://twitter.com/MittRomney/status/438428674250256385, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
A2HM-X7BD (“@GovBrewer: veto of #SB1062 is right.”). 
155 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01 (2014). 
156 See S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014), available at http://www.azleg.gov/ 
legtext/51leg/2r/bills/sb1062p.pdf. The law as presently enacted provides the defense to only “a 
religious assembly or institution.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493 (2014). SB 1062 also 
explicitly allowed a defense against lawsuits brought by private parties; such a defense had 
previously been allowed against only government-initiated suits. 
157  S. Enrolled Act 50, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015), available at 
http://iga.in.gov/static-documents/1/b/d/f/1bdf457b/SB0050.05.ENRS.pdf. 
158 See supra note 151 and accompanying text; see also David S. Cohen & Leonore Carpenter, 
The “Fix” to Indiana’s Law Still Doesn’t Protect Hoosiers from Anti-Gay Discrimination, SLATE (Apr. 2, 
2015, 2:52 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/04/02/indiana_religious_freedom_law_ 
the_fix_still_doesn_t_protect_gay_hoosiers.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9VU3-6MJR 
(lamenting the fix to the Indiana law as a “partial victory at best” because it did not amend 
Indiana’s antidiscrimination laws, which do not explicitly list sexual orientation as a protected 
class). Interestingly, Indiana’s public accommodations statute states that “[i]t is the public policy of 
the state to provide all of its citizens equal opportunity for education, employment, access to 
public conveniences and accommodations, . . . and to eliminate segregation or separation based 
solely on race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry, since such segregation is 
an impediment to equal opportunity.” See IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (2014) (emphasis added). As I 
argue in Section IV.A, courts should read such a broad grant of a right of access against the 
background of the common law duty to serve; a court could thus construe Indiana’s statute to 
prohibit all arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations.  
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IV. THE ROLE OF A REVIVED COMMON LAW DUTY TO SERVE 
A revival of the principles underlying the common law duty to serve can 
help those who suffer sexual orientation discrimination in states whose 
public accommodations statutes do not explicitly provide protection. First, 
under the canon of statutory construction requiring conformity with the 
common law, courts can read state public accommodations statutes to 
provide more expansive protection in light of the common law duty to 
serve’s foundational principles. Second, and more ambitiously, in those 
states that either lack public accommodations laws altogether or whose 
courts refuse to construe those laws more broadly, the common law can 
provide an independent cause of action sounding in tort.  
A. Common Law Conformity 
A fundamental premise of the American legal system is that legislatures 
have the ability to override the common law.159 But courts retain the ability 
to constrain the legislature; even where a statutory codification exists, courts 
are obligated to apply the common law unless and until the legislature 
explicitly abrogates it. Justice Breyer recently discussed this canon of 
statutory construction in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., a case that 
involved the first-sale doctrine of copyright law.160 In holding that the 
relevant sections of the Copyright Act should be read to conform with 
preexisting common law principles, Justice Breyer noted that “‘[w]hen a 
statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law,’ [courts] 
must presume that ‘Congress intended to retain the substance of the 
common law.’”161 Indeed, this canon has long dictated that “[s]tatutes which 
invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring 
the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a 
statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”162 Guided by this interpretive 
canon, Justice Breyer read the relevant statutory provisions in light of the 
“impeccable historic pedigree” of the common law doctrine of first sale, 
which he traced back to the fifteenth century.163 Judges should interpret 
state public accommodations statutes in the same manner. Unless a statute 
 
159 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 14 (adopting the common law of the colony of New York 
“subject to such alterations as the legislature shall make concerning the same”); see also JOEL P. 
TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 234 (2008) 
(recognizing that “[i]t is open to legislatures to override or supplement common law rules”). 
160 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
161 Id. at 1363. 
162 Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). 
163 Id. 
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manifests the legislature’s explicit intent to abrogate the common law duty 
to serve, judges should read these statutes in light of the duty’s historical 
and foundational principles, as outlined above in Part I of this Comment, 
and provide citizens protection against all arbitrary discrimination in public 
accommodations.  
The argument is particularly strong with respect to those public 
accommodations statutes that, in addition to enumerating protected classes 
in their text, guarantee a right of nondiscrimination that is generally 
applicable to all persons.164 Because such statutes essentially codify the 
common law duty, an understanding of the common law doctrine’s 
expansive scope can support arguments that such statutes should be read as 
broadly protecting all persons from arbitrary discrimination, regardless of 
whether they fall into a class enumerated within the statute.  
The State of California provides an apt example. In its 1951 decision in 
Stoumen v. Reilly, the California Supreme Court held that, under the then-
applicable version of its public accommodations statute, the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act,165 bars and restaurants could not reasonably exclude gay patrons 
who were behaving properly.166 In Stoumen, a bar owner brought an action 
for a writ of mandamus against the California Board of Equalization, which 
had indefinitely suspended his liquor license for serving “persons of known 
homosexual tendencies”—a practice the Board claimed made the bar “a 
disorderly house for purposes injurious to public morals” in violation of the 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.167 The court disagreed, reading California’s 
public accommodations statute as providing all members of the public a 
right to patronize businesses unless they were behaving illegally or 
immorally; a proprietor had “no right to exclude” and would be liable for 
doing so without good cause.168 The statute did not identify gay people as a 
protected class,169 nor did the court’s opinion give gay people any special 
protection. The court instead relied on a duty to serve all persons and found 
 
164 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (2014) (“It is the public policy of the state to provide all 
of its citizens equal opportunity for education, employment, access to public conveniences and 
accommodations, . . . and to eliminate segregation or separation based solely on race, religion, 
color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry, since such segregation is an impediment to equal 
opportunity.”). 
165 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51–52 (1950). 
166 234 P.2d 969, 971 (Cal. 1951).  
167 Id. at 970. 
168 Id. at 971. 
169 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (1950). 
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sexual orientation to be an arbitrary basis for exclusion that did not rise to 
the level of good cause.170  
As the California Supreme Court later explained, the California 
Legislature, in enacting the predecessor statute to the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act, codified the common law duty.171 The court’s brief overview of early 
common law doctrine aligned with the conduct theory of the duty’s 
origin.172 A “fundamental” canon of statutory interpretation “is that all 
legislation is to be considered in the light of the common law.”173 Reading 
the statute against its common law background, the court explained that it 
was not limited to prohibiting discrimination based on statutorily protected 
classifications such as race but could also proscribe “all arbitrary 
discrimination by a business enterprise.”174 Although the court described 
Stoumen as “recogniz[ing] the right of homosexuals to obtain food and drink 
in a bar or restaurant,” this right was based not on their status as gay 
persons but rather as members of the general public.175 The court recognized 
that this case “clearly establish[ed] that the Civil Rights Act prohibited all 
arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations.”176 
The California Supreme Court provided this background in the course 
of interpreting the effect of the legislature’s 1959 amendments to the Civil 
Rights Act, which came some eight years after Stoumen. Whereas the statute 
that the Stoumen court construed had read “All citizens . . . are entitled 
to . . . full and equal accommodations . . . of inns, restaurants, hotels, 
eating houses, places where ice cream and soft drinks of any kind are sold 
 
170 Stoumen, 234 P.2d at 971. The California Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in a 
similar case, Tarbox v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles, in which it found that the 
owner of a movie theatre could not lawfully refuse admission to gay patrons. 329 P.2d 553, 556 
(Cal. 1958).  
171 In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 996 (Cal. 1970).  
172 See id. (“These undertakings ‘held themselves out’ as providing a particular product or 
service to the community.” (citing, among other sources, Arterburn, supra note 37, at 418-28)).  
173 Warren R. Maichel, Legislation, The Role of the Common Law in Interpretation of Statutes in 
Missouri, 1952 WASH. U. L.Q. 101, 101. According to one nineteenth century argument, courts in 
code states such as California should interpret common law codifications as though they were 
uncodified common law. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
STATUTES 83 (1982) (“Except . . . where the language is so clear and unequivocal as to leave no 
doubt of an intention to depart from, alter or abrogate the common-law rule concerning the 
subject matter, the courts should avowedly adopt and follow without deviation the uniform 
principle of interpreting all the definitions, statements of doctrine and rules contained in the code 
in complete conformity with the common-law definitions, doctrines and rules, and as to all the 
subordinate effects resulting from this interpretation.” (quoting John Norton Pomeroy, The True 
Method of Interpreting the Civil Code, 4 W. Coast Rep. 109-10 (1884))). 
174 In re Cox, 474 P.2d at 995. 
175 Id. at 997. 
176 Id. 
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for consumption on the premises, barber shops, bath houses, theaters, 
skating rinks, public conveyances and all other places of a public 
accommodation or amusement,”177 the legislature broadened its scope in its 
amendment: “All citizens . . . are free and equal, and no matter what their 
race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and 
equal accommodations . . . in all business establishments of every kind 
whatsoever.”178 Although the 1959 amendments expanded the scope of the 
law to cover all businesses,179 the court faced the question of whether the 
legislature’s addition of specific protected classifications limited the scope of 
protected persons to those within the enumerated classes. The court, 
compelled by its understanding of the common law duty at the statute’s 
core, found that the protected classes were “illustrative, rather than 
restrictive, indicia of the type of conduct condemned” and prohibited all 
arbitrary discrimination.180  
The California Supreme Court slightly retrenched from this position in 
1991, holding that the Unruh Act did not prohibit all arbitrary 
discrimination but rather prohibited only those distinctions based on the 
protected classes enumerated in the Act “or similar personal traits, beliefs, 
or characteristics that bear no relationship to the responsibilities of 
consumers of public accommodations.”181 Although sexual orientation had 
not yet been added as a protected class,182 there is no doubt that, under the 
standard articulated by the court, the statute would have continued to bar 
sexual orientation discrimination. The court’s retrenchment marks a shift 
from businesses having a duty to serve all customers to having a general 
right to exclude customers limited by a statutory duty to serve members of 
specifically enumerated protected classes. The court’s shift in thought is 
emblematic of the modern view that discrimination against gay people is 
legal unless and until it is explicitly proscribed by statute.183 Of course, the 
California Supreme Court’s retrenchment with respect to its interpretation 
 
177 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (1950). 
178 Id. § 51 (1960). 
179 In re Cox, 474 P.2d at 997 & n.8. 
180 Id. at 995; see also Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 121 (Cal. 1982) (“In reaching 
th[e] conclusion [that the Unruh Act bars all arbitrary discrimination], we relied, inter alia, upon the 
fact that the Unruh Act had emanated from the venerable common law doctrine which ‘attached [to 
various “public” or “common” callings] certain obligations including—at various stages of doctrinal 
development—the duty to serve all customers on reasonable terms without discrimination . . . .’” 
(quoting In re Cox, 474 P.2d at 996) (second alteration in original)). 
181 Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 889 (Cal. 1991).  
182 Id. at 878.  
183 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. 
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of the Unruh Act did nothing to diminish the broad content of the common 
law duty, with which the statute was previously coextensive.  
Although California has since included sexual orientation among the 
Unruh Act’s protected classifications,184 the logic and principles behind the 
California Supreme Court’s twentieth century decisions interpreting the 
Act may be persuasive in arguing for a broader interpretation of public 
accommodations statutes in states that have not yet explicitly protected 
sexual orientation. Statutes that grant rights of reasonable access to all 
citizens broadly185 arguably reflect a codification of the common law duty, 
which prohibits all businesses open to the public from arbitrarily 
discriminating against customers, including on the basis of sexual 
orientation. 186  Whereas statutes have broadened the scope of covered 
businesses beyond the inns and common carriers subject to the American 
rule (seemingly a legislative endorsement of the conduct theory), they have 
been understood simultaneously to limit the universe of persons to whom 
such protections apply to certain enumerated classes. 187  Although the 
California Supreme Court ultimately ruled that its civil rights statute was 
no longer fully coextensive with the common law duty to serve,188 the court’s 
holding that the Act’s protected classifications could still be illustrative of the 
types of persons protected provides fodder for the argument that statutes that 
list protected classifications may be read to implicitly include sexual 
orientation. This latter argument may be more readily accepted given the 
modern understanding that public accommodations statutes bar not all 
arbitrary discrimination but rather discrimination on the basis of protected 
class membership. 
 
184 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(c) (West 2014). 
185 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (2014) (“It is the public policy of the state to provide all 
of its citizens equal opportunity for education, employment, access to public conveniences and 
accommodations, . . . and to eliminate segregation or separation based solely on race, religion, 
color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry, since such segregation is an impediment to equal 
opportunity.”). 
186 This argument does not appear to have been successful outside of California. For 
example, despite a broadly worded statutory right of “all persons” to “full and equal 
accommodations,” the Michigan Supreme Court read a related section, which imposed criminal 
sanctions for denying service to certain protected classes, as “restricting the scope” of the right to 
those classes. Riegler v. Holiday Skating Rink, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Mich. 1975) (referencing 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.146 (1968)). Unlike its California counterpart, the Michigan 
Supreme Court appears not to have considered the statute in the context of its common law roots. 
See generally id. (evaluating whether an ice skating rink can refuse to serve a male person because 
of the length of his hair, without considering the common law public accommodations doctrine). 
187 See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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B. An Independent Cause of Action 
If courts are not inclined to broadly construe public accommodations 
statutes to cover all persons protected at common law, persons subjected to 
discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of their sexual 
orientation may be able to simply proceed under an independent common 
law cause of action sounding in tort. 189  In the context of racial 
discrimination, it has been suggested that a common law cause of action 
would serve a gap-filling role by covering an array of commercial enterprises 
that are excluded from Title II. 190  Of course, many state public 
accommodations statutes cover a broader array of businesses than does Title 
II. The common law duty can play an even greater gap-filling role in the 
sexual orientation discrimination context. Whereas all state public 
accommodations statutes proscribe racial discrimination, only twenty-one 
states and the District of Columbia prohibit sexual orientation 
 
189  The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law suggests that courts could evaluate a 
common law claim of a violation of the duty to serve under a burden-shifting framework similar to 
that used in the employment discrimination context. See Note, supra note 34, at 2008 & n.102 
(describing the burden shifting in a Title VII disparate impact claim). The Antidiscrimination 
Principle refers to the burden-shifting framework of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), 
see Note, supra note 34, at 2008 n.102, which controlled disparate impact claims under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 until Congress codified disparate impact in its 1991 amendments to 
the Act, see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012)). Because disparate impact involves facially neutral policies that 
have disproportionate effects on certain groups, the comparison seems inapposite. The framework 
used in individual disparate treatment claims is more appropriate, as disparate treatment claims 
allege that adverse action was taken with discriminatory intent. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-06 (1973). But the frameworks are arguably similar. 
The plaintiff would first make a prima facie case of discrimination, with the burden of 
production then shifting to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the decision to exclude the plaintiff. See id. at 802. The plaintiff could then, at the surrebuttal 
stage, offer proof that the defendant’s stated nondiscriminatory reason is merely pretextual. See id. 
at 804. Since the common law duty prohibits arbitrary exclusion, this framework would work well 
due to its rebuttable presumption that exclusion is unreasonable.  
190 See Note, supra note 34, at 2009 (“[T]he common law duty-to-serve cause of action could 
fill the resulting gaps in the federal antidiscrimination coverage. . . . For example, under recent 
trends in duty-to-serve analysis, this common law cause of action could cover a number of 
commercial establishments excluded from title II . . . .” (footnote omitted)). In the racial 
discrimination context, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 can also play this role. See id.; see also 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976) (holding that § 1981 reaches private acts of racial 
discrimination). A § 1981 claim is not available to gay plaintiffs as it proscribes only racial 
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”); see also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 
427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976) (noting that “the phrase ‘as is enjoyed by white citizens’ . . . emphasiz[es] 
‘the racial character of the rights being protected’” (citation omitted)). 
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discrimination.191 A common law claim would thus do much more than 
merely expand the scope of businesses to which the duty to serve applies; it 
would bring gay people within the scope of antidiscrimination law in the 
twenty-nine states whose public accommodations statutes afford them no 
protection. Judges will have latitude in developing a new common law cause 
of action for refusal of service, but the elements should be roughly as 
follows: the plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) is a business that 
holds itself out as open to the public, (2) has denied service to the plaintiff 
for an arbitrary reason, and (3) by this arbitrary denial of service 
intentionally caused the plaintiff to suffer direct dignitary harm (with no 
requirement that the plaintiff ’s actual sexual orientation correspond with 
the defendant’s perception). To illustrate how such a claim might work in 
practice, let us consider the following hypothetical: 
Two men are seated at nearby tables in a restaurant in a rather conservative 
town. (The restaurant holds itself out as open to the public.) One man, 
Adam, is actually straight, but he appears and behaves in ways that are 
stereotypically associated with being gay. The other man, Ben, is actually 
gay—but is not “out.” Ben’s experiences have led him to believe that it 
would be a bad thing if other people found out that he is gay, so he tries 
pretty hard to come off as straight when he is in public places. The waitress 
makes small talk with him—flirtatiously asking why he is eating alone and 
where his girlfriend is—before taking his order. She then looks over at 
Adam before turning away and walking off toward the kitchen. When she 
returns with Ben’s order, Adam flags her down, explaining that no one has 
come to take his order yet. “That’s right,” the waitress replies. “We don’t 
serve disgusting fags like you here. This is a family restaurant.” Ben, being 
only a table away, hears this. 
Although he is not gay, Adam could succeed on a common law refusal-
of-service claim based on the sexual orientation discrimination he suffers. 
He would need to show that the restaurant (1) held itself out as a business 
open to the public, (2) denied him service for an arbitrary reason (here, his 
perceived sexual orientation), and (3) caused him to suffer direct dignitary 
harm. This Section proceeds to discuss each of these elements in turn, 
followed by a brief discussion on the available remedies. 
 
191 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.  
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1. The Defendant Is a Business that Holds Itself Out 
as Open to the Public 
The question of which businesses are subject to the duty to serve is 
perhaps the greatest hurdle that a plaintiff bringing a common law cause of 
action will face, given the limited scope of businesses covered by the 
majority American rule. 192  Uston v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc. 193—
apparently the only deviation from the majority rule194—will be crucial 
persuasive authority for applying the duty to all businesses that hold 
themselves out as open to the public. Public accommodations statutes 
should also be surprisingly helpful, insofar as their broad application to 
virtually all businesses reflects modern society’s normative view that no 
business that holds itself out as open to the public should be allowed to 
discriminate arbitrarily. As Professor Singer notes, “the prevailing social 
assumption now is that businesses open to the public have no right to 
exclude customers on [a discriminatory] basis . . . and that the law backs 
up this assumption.”195 The assumption that a duty to serve covers all 
businesses reflects an evolution of the modern American rule and yet 
simultaneously marks a return to the duty’s foundational principles. Some, 
including Professor Richard Epstein, are of the view that antidiscrimination 
law ought to apply only to monopoly businesses, with the marketplace 
otherwise serving as a corrective for discrimination.196 Although the free 
market might provide all persons with access to resources, such an argument 
fails to address normative concerns that discrimination is inherently harmful 
to human dignity and autonomy. 
In my hypothetical, Adam can easily show that the restaurant is a 
business that holds itself out as open to the public. 
2. The Defendant Has Denied Service to the Plaintiff 
for an Arbitrary Reason 
The question, of course, is whether sexual orientation discrimination is 
arbitrary or whether a customer’s sexual orientation can ever serve as a 
reasonable basis for denying service. At common law, the duty to serve 
requires a particularized reason for refusing to serve an individual customer; 
 
192 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  
193 445 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1982). 
194 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.  
195 Singer, supra note 22, at 1293.  
196  See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 127 (1992) (“Someone could have made a fortune 
catering solely to blacks who were kept out of white hotels that adopted segregationist policies.”).  
  
1532 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1497 
 
a dislike for a group to which the customer belongs is insufficient to justify 
exclusion.197 In Stoumen v. Reilly, the California Supreme Court held that a 
proprietor could not exclude gay persons who were “acting properly and 
[we]re not committing illegal or immoral acts.”198 In so holding, the court 
relied on common law cases that recognized the right of known prostitutes 
to receive equal service when not engaged in illegal acts.199 Indeed, at oral 
argument in Romer v. Evans, Justice Kennedy recognized the possibility that 
where a state’s law says that “you cannot bar people from public 
accommodations for any arbitrary or unreasonable reason,” a court could 
“find that it was unreasonable or arbitrary to bar a person from public 
accommodations by reason of sexual orientation.”200 
The common law thus seems to support the proposition that sexual 
orientation discrimination is arbitrary. Many individuals who refuse to 
provide services for same-sex weddings, however, genuinely believe as a 
matter of conscience that same-sex marriage is immoral. Might the common 
law legitimize the distinction between refusing service to gay individuals 
and refusing services related to same-sex marriages that certain business 
owners have attempted to raise?201 Surely not; plaintiffs could cite opinions 
like that of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Elane Photography, in which 
the statute’s prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination was construed 
to extend to same-sex commitment ceremonies despite perceptions of that 
conduct as immoral.202 The claim that same-sex marriages could not be 
reasonably excluded should have even stronger weight in states that have 
legalized same-sex marriage,203 since such conduct is given the imprimatur 
of the state. Finally, although the common law cause of action would be 
brought by and against private parties, the public nature of businesses that 
open their doors to the community at large might lead plaintiffs—and 
courts—to look to the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, 
 
197 See Note, supra note 34, at 2006 & nn.87-89 (surveying common law cases that prohibited 
exclusion of “a youth, a ‘hippie,’ or a member of a particular militia company”). 
198 234 P.2d 969, 971 (1951).  
199 Id. 
200 Oral Argument at 35:56, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_1039. 
201 See supra notes 129, 138 and accompanying text. 
202 See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.  
203 The ceremony at issue in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), was 
not a marriage but rather a commitment ceremony; the refusal of service occurred prior to New 
Mexico’s legalization of same-sex marriage. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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which has held that moral disapprobation of homosexuality can never satisfy 
the rational basis test, the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny.204 
In my hypothetical, Adam is discriminated against on the basis of his 
perceived sexual orientation. If courts accept that sexual orientation 
discrimination is arbitrary, Adam can succeed in satisfying this element as well.  
3. The Defendant Intentionally Caused the Plaintiff 
to Suffer Direct Dignitary Harm 
A core element of any tort claim is the plaintiff ’s harm. A key advantage 
of a common law duty-to-serve claim over a statutory claim is the common 
law’s focus on the discriminator’s conduct—whether it is arbitrary or 
unreasonable—rather than on the plaintiff ’s membership in a statutorily 
enumerated protected class. The common law can thus avoid any potential 
correspondence requirement between the plaintiff ’s actual sexual 
orientation and that perceived by the defendant.205 The focus on the basis of 
the defendant’s decision to discriminate—and not on determining the 
plaintiff ’s actual sexual orientation—is important for two reasons. 
First, the lack of a correspondence requirement ensures that the 
plaintiff ’s sexual orientation will not be a litigated issue. As discussed above, 
sexual orientation is an amorphous classification,206 and outside of wedding-
related discrimination (where one’s sexual orientation could be inferred 
from one’s intention to marry a person of the same sex), it is difficult to 
comprehend on what sort of evidentiary bases it could be determined. 
Having to prove one’s sexual orientation would likely require one to share 
intensely personal and intimate details, perhaps touching on one’s sexual 
history and practices. Some plaintiffs may wish not to identify as gay (or as 
having any particular sexual orientation) at all. Forcing plaintiffs to publicly 
 
204 See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that section 3 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional without stating a level of scrutiny but citing Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (noting that moral disapproval 
of homosexual relations is not sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of Texas’s sodomy statute); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (declaring a Colorado constitutional amendment that 
precluded state or local government from banning discrimination against gays, bisexuals, and 
lesbians as unconstitutional under rational basis review). While the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment binds only state actors, the Court’s holding that moral disapprobation of 
homosexuality is an insufficient basis for discrimination can be instructive and persuasive in the 
public accommodations context.  
205 Cf. D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: “Misperception Discrimination” 
and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 87, 100-13 (2013) (discussing cases 
imposing a requirement that plaintiffs bringing intentional discrimination claims under Title VII 
be an actual member of the protected class). 
206 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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identify with, and establish, a gay (or other non-heterosexual) identity as an 
element of their discrimination claim could thus significantly deter plaintiffs 
from bringing claims. The common law claim neatly avoids this problem. 
Second, and perhaps more important, the common law’s lack of 
correspondence requirement would allow all people—whether gay or not—
to assert a duty-to-serve claim, ensuring that discriminatory conduct is 
sufficiently deterred. Sexual orientation discrimination harms not only the 
dignity of the immediate victim of the discriminatory act but also the 
dignity and autonomy of those who, fearing such discrimination, feel forced 
to comply with heterosexual norms. Because the harm of sexual orientation 
discrimination in public accommodations is so far-reaching (and often goes 
unnoticed), underdeterrence is an obvious issue. But focusing on the basis 
of the discriminatory decision, rather than on the classification of the 
person who suffered the immediate harm, ensures greater deterrence by 
allowing all instances of intentional sexual orientation discrimination to give 
rise to liability. 
In my hypothetical, there is no doubt that that the waitress intended to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, but she happened to 
misperceive Adam as gay. To be sure, the waitress’s discriminatory act harms 
Adam’s dignity and autonomy—it is a direct attack on his chosen identity 
and self-expression—but it does not do so on the basis of his actual sexual 
orientation.207 And, of course, Ben’s dignity and autonomy are harmed too. 
Although he is not denied service—indeed, he receives excellent service—
the waitress’s anti-gay speech reinforces his fear of coming out and forces 
his continued compliance with heterosexual norms. The common law would 
allow Adam to bring a claim because it is concerned not with the plaintiff ’s 
actual sexual orientation but rather with whether the business’s basis for 
exclusion is reasonable. And sexual orientation discrimination is certainly 
no more reasonable when it is misdirected at non-gay individuals. Allowing 
Adam to bring a claim vindicates not only his own injury but also the injury 
wrought upon gay individuals by the regime of forced heteronormativity 
that anti-gay discrimination perpetuates. It also ensures that businesses that 
intend to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation do not escape 
liability when they misperceive a customer’s sexual orientation by relying on 
stereotypes. Indeed, the elimination of sexual orientation stereotypes is a 
core goal of the common law duty.  
 
207 Or at least not on the basis of Adam being gay. Arguably, though, discrimination against a 
straight person for failing to conform to heterosexual norms is itself a form of sexual orientation 
discrimination. 
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4. Remedies 
A common law duty-to-serve claim must provide a plaintiff with relief 
that goes beyond merely vindicating his dignity. As with the elements of the 
claim itself, judges will have latitude in determining the appropriate relief. 
The harm caused by arbitrary denials of service—especially when based on 
one’s identity and chosen self-expression—is emotional in nature. In civil 
society, businesses open to the public play a large role in defining who is a 
part of the community. Given that the defendant’s conduct likely consists of 
abusive or insulting words, the harm of the refusal-of-service tort is akin to 
that of intentional infliction of emotional distress.208 Interestingly, as Prosser 
notes, long before intentional infliction of emotional distress became an 
independent tort, courts imposed liability for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress on “common carriers, telegraph companies, and 
innkeepers.” 209  Indeed, the Second Restatement of Torts subjects “[a] 
common carrier or other public utility . . . to liability to patrons utilizing its 
facilities for gross insults which reasonably offend them, inflicted by the 
utility’s servants while otherwise acting within the scope of their 
employment.”210 Compensatory damages can be awarded for noneconomic 
harm, including emotional distress.211 And punitive damages are especially 
appropriate here, given the intentional and outrageous nature of the 
defendant’s discriminatory act and our societal goal of deterring 
discrimination in the marketplace.212 
C. The Challenge Posed by a Politicized Judiciary 
This Comment has argued that a revived common law duty-to-serve 
claim is needed because state statutes are inadequate to protect individuals 
from sexual orientation discrimination in commerce. My argument relies 
upon the hope that, although many state legislatures appear to lack the 
political will to statutorily protect their citizens from sexual orientation 
discrimination in public accommodations, state judges might be willing to 
entertain a common law claim based upon the duty to serve’s foundational 
 
208 See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. 
REV. 789, 794 (2007). 
209 Id. at 796 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 12, at 57-58 (5th ed. 1984)). Professor Kircher’s hypothesis for why courts were 
willing to find liability is rooted in the economic theory, see id. at 796-97, but the conduct theory 
provides an equally plausible explanation.  
210 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48 (1965). 
211 See id. § 905. 
212 See id. § 908. 
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principles. But due to the elected and politicized nature of the judiciary in 
many states, gay people may fare no better in the courts than they have with 
the legislature. Although the Uston court’s decision to revive the duty to 
serve did not directly implicate sexual orientation (and so is not 
controversial in quite the same way), it is worth noting that New Jersey 
Supreme Court justices are appointed.213 New Jersey justices initially serve 
seven-year terms and receive life tenure if reappointed,214 insulating them 
from the political process more than elected judges who can run for 
reelection (or who might run for other elected office) and those appointed 
judges who are subject to popular retention votes.  
The current situation in the Alabama state courts is illustrative. Roy 
Moore, Alabama’s Chief Justice (and two-time failed Republican 
gubernatorial candidate215), has been fighting to limit the effect216 of the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama’s 
injunction in Searcy v. Strange,217 the case that declared the state’s ban on 
same-sex marriage unconstitutional.218 Moore was elected Chief Justice in 
2012 with nearly fifty-two percent of the vote,219  despite having been 
removed from that same position in 2003 for his refusal to comply with a 
federal court order to remove a large statue of the Ten Commandments 
 
213 See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § VI, para. 1 (“The Governor shall nominate and appoint, with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, the Chief Justice and associate justices of the Supreme 
Court . . . .”). 
214 See id. art. VI, § VI, para. 3 (“The Justices of the Supreme Court . . . shall hold their 
offices for initial terms of 7 years and upon reappointment shall hold their offices during good 
behavior . . . .”). 
215 See SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF ALA., ELECTION RESULTS ARCHIVE—GOVERNOR 
(1946–2010), available at http://alabamavotes.gov/downloads/election/general/eagovernor1946-
2010.xls (showing that Moore won only 19.35% of the vote in the 2010 Republican gubernatorial 
primary and only 33.34% in the 2006 Republican gubernatorial primary); Eric Velasco, The Gospel 
According to Roy, POLITICO MAG. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/ 
2015/02/roy-moore-alabama-gay-marriage-115128.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4YHH-RCHG 
(“[Moore] made two failed bids for Alabama governor and toyed with running for president under 
the Constitution Party banner.”). 
216 See Alan Blinder, Judge Defies Gay Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2015, at A1 (“In a 
dramatic show of defiance toward the federal judiciary, Chief Justice Roy S. Moore of the Alabama 
Supreme Court on Sunday night ordered the state’s probate judges not to issue marriage licenses 
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(which Moore himself had commissioned) from the courthouse.220 Some 
believe that Moore is positioning himself to run for governor yet again.221 
Recall that Alabama is one of the five states that has no public 
accommodations statute,222 meaning that only a common law claim could 
offer relief. Given its highly politicized nature, it seems unlikely that gay 
citizens would fare any better with the Alabama judiciary than they have 
with its legislature. 
But I do not believe that the situation is nearly this bleak. To be sure, 
there are other judges like Roy Moore sitting on the Alabama courts and on 
state courts across this country—but there are other judges like Morris 
Pashman too. Although accounts of incrementalism might make the 
common law seem conservative, the common law actually has the potential 
to be quite progressive.223 The beauty of the common law is that it takes 
only one enlightened judge to bring about change. 
CONCLUSION 
The common law has long imposed upon businesses a duty to serve all  
customers. This duty has been largely forgotten, eclipsed by the public  
accommodations statutes that arose beginning in the late nineteenth century. 
These statutes came to cover virtually all businesses, extending beyond the 
scope of the majority American rule in what marked a return to the duty’s 
origins at English common law. However, many of these statutes are not 
equipped to combat sexual orientation discrimination, which may become an 
even greater problem as same-sex marriage becomes legal in states that lack 
affirmative statutory protections for gay people. While the current legal 
milieu—with its statutory and regulatory obsession—has led many to focus on 
finding ways to protect gay people by statute, in many cases there will not be 
the political will to enact meaningful protections. Until such will exists, the 
common law duty to serve can play an essential gap-filling function that will 
provide gay people with the immediate protection that their human dignity 
and autonomy require. 
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